subnet.im

2406:9dc0:1010::/48

At a glance

Subnets

65,536 × /64

/48 block

Visibility

98%

61 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

APNICAU

Allocated 19th October 2020

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.

OriginVantage point · London, UK
One AS path to 2406:9dc0:1010::/48 as seen from London, UK, read outward from the origin: AS10153 → AS137387 → AS135373 → AS131910 → AS34685 → AS133375 → AS10241 → AS38008 → AS3356 → AS15576 → AS51907. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS10153Yuan Ze Universit…OriginAS137387HUALONG TECHNOLOG…AS135373EFLY NETWORK LIMI…AS131910SORACOM. INC.AS34685Anders & Ganz GmbHAS133375CHUAN KAI INTERNA…AS10241Options & Choices…AS38008Aperture Science …AS3356Lumen (Level 3)AS15576NTS workspace AGAS51907Kanton Zug

Seen from London, UK

  1. Peer of AS10153seen on 61 paths from 61 vantage points
  2. Peer of AS137387seen on 61 paths from 61 vantage points
  3. Peer of AS135373seen on 61 paths from 61 vantage points
  4. Peer of AS131910seen on 61 paths from 61 vantage points
  5. Peer of AS34685seen on 61 paths from 61 vantage points
  6. Peer of AS133375seen on 122 paths from 62 vantage points
  7. Peer of AS10241seen on 585 paths from 141 vantage points
  8. Peer of AS38008seen on 2,245 paths from 106 vantage points
  9. Peer of AS3356seen on 209,228 paths from 4 vantage points
  10. Peer of AS15576seen on 442,038 paths from 2 vantage points
  11. 11AS51907Kanton ZugCHVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. Amsterdam10153137387135373131910346851333751024138008→ ⋯This path
  2. London, UK10153137387135373131910346851333751024138008→ ⋯Shown above
  3. Sao Paulo10153137387135373131910346851333751024138008→ ⋯This path
  4. Singapore10153137387135373131910346851333751024138008→ ⋯This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

98%

Seen by 61 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
APNIC — Asia-Pacific
Country
Australia
Allocated
19th October 2020
Allocation block
2406:9dc0::/32
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2406:9dc0:1010::/48
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2406:9dc0:1010::/44AS10153/48
2406:9dc0:1010::/44AS141747/48
2406:9dc0:1010::/44AS18250/48

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

No prefix of the same length in the same parent block is announced.

History

  1. AS1015312th August 2026 present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.