subnet.im

2406:6840::/32

At a glance

Subnets

4,294,967,296 × /64

/32 block

Visibility

100%

62 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

APNICNP

Allocated 1st September 2020

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.

OriginVantage point · London, UK
One AS path to 2406:6840::/32 as seen from London, UK, read outward from the origin: AS135337 → AS45650 → AS9498 → AS51907. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS135337Cloud Himalaya Pv…OriginAS45650VIA NET COMMUNICA…AS9498Bharti Airtel Ltd.AS51907Kanton Zug

Seen from London, UK

  1. Peer of AS135337seen on 695 paths from 140 vantage points
  2. Peer of AS45650seen on 13,399 paths from 142 vantage points
  3. Peer of AS9498seen on 31,276 paths from 2 vantage points
  4. 4AS51907Kanton ZugCHVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. Amsterdam135337456509498213151This path
  2. London, UK13533745650949851907Shown above
  3. Sao Paulo13533745650949832590This path
  4. Singapore135337456509498132337This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

100%

Seen by 62 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
APNIC — Asia-Pacific
Country
Nepal
Allocated
1st September 2020
Allocation block
2406:6840::/32
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2406:6840::/32
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2406:6840::/32AS135337/32

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2406:6840::/32: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2406:6840::/32AS135337This prefix2406:6840:100::/…AS1353372406:6840:101::/…AS1353372406:6840:102::/…AS1353372406:6840:103::/…AS135337

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Announcements contained within 2406:6840::/32
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2406:6840:100::/4865.5k × /64AS135337Cloud Himalaya Pvt Ltd62/62
2406:6840:101::/4865.5k × /64AS135337Cloud Himalaya Pvt Ltd62/62
2406:6840:102::/4865.5k × /64AS135337Cloud Himalaya Pvt Ltd62/62
2406:6840:103::/4865.5k × /64AS135337Cloud Himalaya Pvt Ltd62/62

Sibling prefixes

No prefix of the same length in the same parent block is announced.

History

  1. AS13533712th August 2026 present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.