211.253.61.0/24
Seoul Metropolitan Government Computer CenterAS17574
NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICEAS17841
Announced by more than one origin AS (MOAS).
At a glance
Addresses
/24 block
Visibility
42 of 80 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
KRAllocated 8th September 2000
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Oregon, US.
Seen from Oregon, US
- Peer of AS17574seen on 468 paths from 48 vantage points
- Peer of AS9318seen on 8,247 paths from 17 vantage points
- Peer of AS1299seen on 100,308 paths from 35 vantage points
- Peer of AS3257seen on 59,210 paths from 1 vantage point
- Peer of AS23352seen on 103,654 paths from 1 vantage point
SE
USOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Singapore175749318132337This path
- Amsterdam1784147666939213151This path
- London, UK17574931841348529This path
- Sao Paulo1757493187013356266213This path
- Oregon, US175749318129932572335220130Shown above
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
53%
Seen by 42 of 80 full-feed vantage points
Partially propagatedObserved at 5 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- APNIC — Asia-Pacific
- Country
- South Korea
- Allocated
- 8th September 2000
- Allocation block
- 211.252.0.0/15
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- No ROA
No ROA covers this prefix, so RPKI has nothing to say about it either way. This is still the common case for a large share of the routing table.
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.
Covering announcements
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 211.252.0.0/15 | 131k | AS4766Korea Telecom | 80/80 |
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 211.253.60.0/24 | 256 | AS17574Seoul Metropolitan Government Computer Center | 24/80 |
| 211.253.60.0/24 | 256 | AS17841NATIONAL INFORMATION RESOURCES SERVICE | 56/80 |
History
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Open 211.253.61.0/24 in the calculator/24 reference
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.