2a0d:b201:1010::/44
At a glance
Subnets
/44 block
Visibility
61 of 62 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
KZAllocated 2nd November 2017
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.
Seen from London, UK
- Peer of AS206026seen on 7,406 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS197556seen on 14,172 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS35168seen on 47,453 paths from 138 vantage points
- Peer of AS6939seen on 132,979 paths from 2 vantage points
US
CHOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Amsterdam206026197556351689002213151This path
- London, UK20602619755635168693951907Shown above
- Sao Paulo20602619755635168693932590This path
- Singapore206026197556351686939132337This path
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
98%
Seen by 61 of 62 full-feed vantage points
Globally propagatedObserved at 4 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
- Country
- Kazakhstan
- Allocated
- 2nd November 2017
- Allocation block
- 2a0d:b200::/29
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- No ROA
No ROA covers this prefix, so RPKI has nothing to say about it either way. This is still the common case for a large share of the routing table.
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.
Covering announcements
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2a0d:b201::/32 | 4.3B × /64 | AS197556Kar-Tel LLC | 61/62 |
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2a0d:b201:1000::/44 | 1M × /64 | AS206026Kar-Tel LLC | 61/62 |
History
- AS20602612th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.