subnet.im

192.6.120.0/24

FASTNET DATA INCAS8796

DDOS PROTECTION LTDAS213840

Announced by more than one origin AS (MOAS).

At a glance

Addresses

256

/24 block

Visibility

99%

76 of 77 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

ARINUS

Allocated 26th August 1983

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.

OriginVantage point · London, UK
One AS path to 192.6.120.0/24 as seen from London, UK, read outward from the origin: AS8796 → AS1299 → AS8529. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS8796FASTNET DATA INCOriginAS1299Arelion (fka. Tel…AS8529Zain Omantel Inte…

Seen from London, UK

  1. Peer of AS8796seen on 28,447 paths from 134 vantage points
  2. Peer of AS1299seen on 385,312 paths from 2 vantage points

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. London, UK879612998529Shown above
  2. Sao Paulo8796291435280This path
  3. Singapore8796291423673This path
  4. Amsterdam87961299250918298This path
  5. Oregon, US879629142335220130This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

99%

Seen by 76 of 77 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 5 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
ARIN — North America
Country
United States
Allocated
26th August 1983
Allocation block
192.6.120.0/23
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 192.6.120.0/24
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
192.6.120.0/24AS213840/24
192.6.120.0/24AS395886/24
192.6.120.0/24AS7488/24
192.6.120.0/24AS8796/24

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 192.6.120.0/24
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
192.6.121.0/24256AS8796FASTNET DATA INC33/77
192.6.121.0/24256AS213840DDOS PROTECTION LTD44/77

History

  1. AS879622nd October 2026 — present
  2. AS21384020th October 2026 — present
  3. AS879618th October 2026 — 20th October 2026
  4. AS21384023rd September 2026 — 18th October 2026
  5. AS879628th September 2026 — 28th September 2026
  6. AS879627th September 2026 — 27th September 2026
  7. AS879612th August 2026 — 25th September 2026
  8. AS21384022nd September 2026 — 22nd September 2026
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Open 192.6.120.0/24 in the calculator/24 reference

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.