31.56.183.0/24
At a glance
Addresses
/24 block
Visibility
79 of 80 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
AEAllocated 28th January 2011
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.
Seen from London, UK
- Peer of AS219048seen on 237 paths from 79 vantage points
- Peer of AS397423seen on 5,537 paths from 106 vantage points
- Peer of AS174seen on 808,327 paths from 83 vantage points
- Peer of AS1299seen on 403,291 paths from 2 vantage points
IN
US
SEOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Singapore219048397423174132337This path
- London, UK21904839742317412998529Shown above
- Sao Paulo2190483974231743356266213This path
- Amsterdam2190483974231745829941051213151This path
- Oregon, US21904839742317432572335220130This path
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
99%
Seen by 79 of 80 full-feed vantage points
Globally propagatedObserved at 5 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
- Country
- United Arab Emirates
- Allocated
- 28th January 2011
- Allocation block
- 31.56.0.0/14
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- Invalid
A ROA covers this prefix but does not authorise this origin AS at this prefix length. That is either a misconfiguration or a hijack, and many networks will drop the route.
ROAs covering this prefix
| ROA prefix | Authorised origin | Max length |
|---|---|---|
| 31.56.183.0/24 | AS48538 | /24 |
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Covering announcements
No less specific announcement covers this prefix.
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 31.56.182.0/24 | 256 | AS204464NextServ LLC | 79/80 |
History
- AS21904812th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Open 31.56.183.0/24 in the calculator/24 reference
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.