2804:6d50::/34
At a glance
Subnets
/34 block
Visibility
11 of 62 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
BRAllocated 17th March 2020
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Singapore.
Seen from Singapore
- Peer of AS270524seen on 324 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS266630seen on 1,099 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS7738seen on 121,785 paths from 141 vantage points
- Peer of AS52320seen on 230 paths from 6 vantage points
- Peer of AS8966seen on 133,632 paths from 2 vantage points
CO
AE
SGOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
18%
Seen by 11 of 62 full-feed vantage points
Seen by few vantage pointsObserved at 4 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- LACNIC — Latin America and the Caribbean
- Country
- Brazil
- Allocated
- 17th March 2020
- Allocation block
- 2804:6d50::/32
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- Invalid
A ROA covers this prefix but does not authorise this origin AS at this prefix length. That is either a misconfiguration or a hijack, and many networks will drop the route.
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.
Covering announcements
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2804:6d50::/33 | 2.1B × /64 | AS270524JSNET TELECOM | 62/62 |
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 2804:6d50:4000::/34 | 1.1B × /64 | AS270524JSNET TELECOM | 11/62 |
History
- AS27052412th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.