subnet.im

2804:6ffc::/32

At a glance

Subnets

4,294,967,296 × /64

/32 block

Visibility

100%

62 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

LACNICBR

Allocated 12th May 2020

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Sao Paulo.

OriginVantage point · Sao Paulo
One AS path to 2804:6ffc::/32 as seen from Sao Paulo, read outward from the origin: AS270699 → AS61922 → AS16735 → AS32590. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS270699GLOBAL NET TELECOMOriginAS61922CNX TELECOMAS16735Algar TelecomAS32590Valve Corporation

Seen from Sao Paulo

  1. Peer of AS270699seen on 705 paths from 141 vantage points
  2. Peer of AS61922seen on 370 paths from 112 vantage points
  3. Peer of AS16735seen on 2,129 paths from 2 vantage points
  4. 4AS32590Valve CorporationUSVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. Amsterdam2706996192214840213151This path
  2. Sao Paulo270699619221673532590Shown above
  3. Singapore2706996192237468132337This path
  4. London, UK270699619221673533561557651907This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

100%

Seen by 62 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
LACNIC — Latin America and the Caribbean
Country
Brazil
Allocated
12th May 2020
Allocation block
2804:6ffc::/32
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2804:6ffc::/32
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2804:6ffc::/32AS270699/44

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2804:6ffc::/32: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2804:6ffc::/32AS270699This prefix2804:6ffc:100::/…AS2706992804:6ffc:1f0::/…AS2706992804:6ffc:200::/…AS2706992804:6ffc:2f0::/…AS270699

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Announcements contained within 2804:6ffc::/32
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2804:6ffc:100::/441M × /64AS270699GLOBAL NET TELECOM62/62
2804:6ffc:1f0::/441M × /64AS270699GLOBAL NET TELECOM62/62
2804:6ffc:200::/441M × /64AS270699GLOBAL NET TELECOM62/62
2804:6ffc:2f0::/441M × /64AS270699GLOBAL NET TELECOM62/62

Sibling prefixes

No prefix of the same length in the same parent block is announced.

History

  1. AS27069912th August 2026 present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.