85.198.3.0/24
At a glance
Addresses
/24 block
Visibility
79 of 80 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
Allocated 31st January 2005
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Amsterdam.
Seen from Amsterdam
- Peer of AS34513seen on 711 paths from 79 vantage points
- Peer of AS44285seen on 4,626 paths from 80 vantage points
- Peer of AS43754seen on 152,403 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS41689seen on 152,403 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS49666seen on 8,599 paths from 78 vantage points
- Peer of AS34984seen on 90,806 paths from 139 vantage points
- Peer of AS6453seen on 82,525 paths from 3 vantage points
- Peer of AS34549seen on 716,762 paths from 2 vantage points
One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Singapore34513442854375441689496666939132337This path
- Oregon, US3451344285437544168949666693920130This path
- Amsterdam345134428543754416894966634984645334549→ ⋯Shown above
- London, UK34513442854375441689496663498433568529This path
- Sao Paulo3451344285437544168949666349843356266213This path
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
99%
Seen by 79 of 80 full-feed vantage points
Globally propagatedObserved at 5 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
- Country
Iran
- Allocated
- 31st January 2005
- Allocation block
- 85.198.0.0/21
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- Valid
A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.
ROAs covering this prefix
| ROA prefix | Authorised origin | Max length |
|---|---|---|
| 85.198.3.0/24 | AS34513 | /24 |
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.
Covering announcements
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 85.198.0.0/21 | 2k | AS34513Tarashe Sabz Tehran Co. Ltd. | 79/80 |
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 85.198.2.0/24 | 256 | AS34513Tarashe Sabz Tehran Co. Ltd. | 79/80 |
History
- AS3451312th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Open 85.198.3.0/24 in the calculator/24 reference
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.