2a0b:cdc2::/32
At a glance
Subnets
/32 block
Visibility
19 of 62 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
SEAllocated 17th August 2017
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Singapore.
Seen from Singapore
- Peer of AS35790seen on 4,641 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS12552seen on 1,052 paths from 72 vantage points
- Peer of AS31027seen on 15 paths from 2 vantage points
- Peer of AS8966seen on 133,632 paths from 2 vantage points
DK
AE
SGOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Amsterdam3579012552213151This path
- London, UK35790125523428851907This path
- Singapore3579012552310278966132337Shown above
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
31%
Seen by 19 of 62 full-feed vantage points
Seen by few vantage pointsObserved at 4 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
- Country
- Sweden
- Allocated
- 17th August 2017
- Allocation block
- 2a0b:cdc0::/29
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- Invalid
A ROA covers this prefix but does not authorise this origin AS at this prefix length. That is either a misconfiguration or a hijack, and many networks will drop the route.
ROAs covering this prefix
| ROA prefix | Authorised origin | Max length |
|---|---|---|
| 2a0b:cdc0::/29 | AS35790 | /29 |
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Covering announcements
No less specific announcement covers this prefix.
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
No prefix of the same length in the same parent block is announced.
History
- AS3579012th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.