122.0.2.0/24
At a glance
Addresses
/24 block
Visibility
80 of 80 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
THAllocated 4th December 2006
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Amsterdam.
Seen from Amsterdam
- Peer of AS38293seen on 388 paths from 141 vantage points
- Peer of AS38794seen on 16,380 paths from 133 vantage points
- Peer of AS45796seen on 13,247 paths from 109 vantage points
- Peer of AS6939seen on 309,709 paths from 2 vantage points
US
DEOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Singapore382933879445796132337This path
- Amsterdam3829338794457966939213151Shown above
- London, UK38293387944579646378529This path
- Sao Paulo3829338794457966939266213This path
- Oregon, US382933879445796693920130This path
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
100%
Seen by 80 of 80 full-feed vantage points
Globally propagatedObserved at 5 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- APNIC — Asia-Pacific
- Country
- Thailand
- Allocated
- 4th December 2006
- Allocation block
- 122.0.0.0/21
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- No ROA
No ROA covers this prefix, so RPKI has nothing to say about it either way. This is still the common case for a large share of the routing table.
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.
Covering announcements
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 122.0.0.0/21 | 2k | AS38293Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 80/80 |
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 122.0.3.0/24 | 256 | AS38293Ministry of Foreign Affairs | 80/80 |
History
- AS3829312th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Open 122.0.2.0/24 in the calculator/24 reference
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.