2001:503:c27::/48
Verisign Anycast GB 0AAS396549
Verisign Anycast DE 0EAS397197
Verisign Anycast SG 0DAS396729
Verisign Anycast BR 0EAS396659
Verisign Anycast SI 0AAS396690
Verisign Anycast US 1IAS396574
Verisign Anycast US 2UAS397203
Verisign Anycast JP 0EAS396605
Verisign Anycast CH 0AAS396761
Verisign Anycast GB 0HAS397194
Verisign Anycast ZA 0BAS396675
Verisign Anycast GB 0BAS396550
Verisign Anycast KW 0AAS396682
Verisign Anycast IE 0AAS396653
Verisign Anycast IN 0BAS396629
Verisign Anycast RU 0BAS396686
Verisign Anycast US 2KAS396654
Verisign Anycast US 0LAS396545
Verisign Anycast AU 0BAS396739
Verisign Anycast NL 0LAS396566
Verisign Anycast FR 0CAS396707
Announced by more than one origin AS (MOAS).
At a glance
Subnets
/48 block
Visibility
15 of 62 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
USAllocated 3rd June 2004
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Amsterdam.
Seen from Amsterdam
- Peer of AS397197seen on 723 paths from 68 vantage points
- Peer of AS7342seen on 34 paths from 2 vantage points
DEOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Amsterdam3971977342213151Shown above
- London, UK3967612641551907This path
- Sao Paulo3966592641532590This path
- Singapore3965497342132337This path
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
24%
Seen by 15 of 62 full-feed vantage points
Seen by few vantage pointsObserved at 2 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- ARIN — North America
- Country
- United States
- Allocated
- 3rd June 2004
- Allocation block
- 2001:503:c27::/48
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- Valid
A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.
ROAs covering this prefix
| ROA prefix | Authorised origin | Max length |
|---|---|---|
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS10515 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS19836 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS20172 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS20362 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS20431 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS211369 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS21313 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS22547 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS25485 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS26415 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS27544 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS32651 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36616 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36617 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36618 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36619 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36620 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36621 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36622 | /48 |
| 2001:503:c27::/48 | AS36623 | /48 |
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Covering announcements
No less specific announcement covers this prefix.
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
No prefix of the same length in the same parent block is announced.
History
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.