89.28.131.0/24
At a glance
Addresses
/24 block
Visibility
80 of 80 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
Allocated 14th July 2006
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Singapore.
Seen from Singapore
- Peer of AS41284seen on 273 paths from 77 vantage points
- Peer of AS9198seen on 114,191 paths from 138 vantage points
- Peer of AS12389seen on 26,029 paths from 1 vantage point
- Peer of AS4766seen on 70,419 paths from 2 vantage points
One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- London, UK412849198123898529This path
- Amsterdam412849198437276939213151This path
- Sao Paulo41284919832163356266213This path
- Singapore412849198123894766132337Shown above
- Oregon, US41284919843727693920130This path
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
100%
Seen by 80 of 80 full-feed vantage points
Globally propagatedObserved at 5 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
- Country
Kazakhstan
- Allocated
- 14th July 2006
- Allocation block
- 89.28.128.0/21
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- No ROA
No ROA covers this prefix, so RPKI has nothing to say about it either way. This is still the common case for a large share of the routing table.
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.
Covering announcements
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 89.28.128.0/21 | 2k | AS41284Limited Liability Company Vostok On-Line | 80/80 |
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 89.28.130.0/24 | 256 | AS41284Limited Liability Company Vostok On-Line | 80/80 |
History
- AS4128412th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Open 89.28.131.0/24 in the calculator/24 reference
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.