subnet.im

103.67.59.0/24

Korea National Police UniversityAS4756

At a glance

Addresses

256

/24 block

Visibility

99%

79 of 80 vantage points

RPKI

No ROA

Registry

APNICKR

Allocated 18th October 2023

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Singapore.

OriginVantage point · Singapore
One AS path to 103.67.59.0/24 as seen from Singapore, read outward from the origin: AS4756 → AS3786 → AS132337. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS4756Korea National Po…OriginAS3786LG DACOM Corporat…AS132337Axclusive

Seen from Singapore

  1. 1AS4756Korea National Police UniversityKROrigin
    Peer of AS4756seen on 158 paths from 79 vantage points
  2. 2AS3786LG DACOM CorporationKR
    Peer of AS3786seen on 7,001 paths from 2 vantage points
  3. 3AS132337AxclusiveSGVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. London, UK475637868529This path
  2. Singapore47563786132337Shown above
  3. Amsterdam4756378634549213151This path
  4. Sao Paulo475637863356266213This path
  5. Oregon, US47563786693920130This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

99%

Seen by 79 of 80 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 5 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
APNIC — Asia-Pacific
Country
South Korea
Allocated
18th October 2023
Allocation block
103.67.58.0/23
Status
allocated
Origin validation
No ROA

No ROA covers this prefix, so RPKI has nothing to say about it either way. This is still the common case for a large share of the routing table.

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 103.67.59.0/24: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.103.67.58.0/23AS4756103.67.59.0/24AS4756This prefix103.67.58.0/24AS4756

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

Announcements that contain 103.67.59.0/24
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
103.67.58.0/23512AS4756Korea National Police University80/80

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 103.67.59.0/24
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
103.67.58.0/24256AS4756Korea National Police University79/80

History

  1. AS475612th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Open 103.67.59.0/24 in the calculator/24 reference

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.