SUBNET.IM

2a07:bbc2::/48

At a glance

Subnets

65,536 × /64

/48 block

Visibility

100%

62 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

RIPE NCCUA

Allocated 20th July 2016

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.

OriginVantage point · London, UK
One AS path to 2a07:bbc2::/48 as seen from London, UK, read outward from the origin: AS50864 → AS34867 → AS6939 → AS51907. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS50864IT TeleNet Ltd.OriginAS34867Cosmonova LLCAS6939Hurricane Electri…AS51907Kanton Zug

Seen from London, UK

  1. Peer of AS50864seen on 833 paths from 140 vantage points
  2. Peer of AS34867seen on 1,839 paths from 99 vantage points
  3. Peer of AS6939seen on 132,979 paths from 2 vantage points
  4. 4AS51907Kanton ZugCHVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. Amsterdam50864348676939213151This path
  2. London, UK5086434867693951907Shown above
  3. Sao Paulo5086434867693932590This path
  4. Singapore50864348676939132337This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

100%

Seen by 62 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
Country
Ukraine
Allocated
20th July 2016
Allocation block
2a07:bbc0::/29
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2a07:bbc2::/48
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2a07:bbc2::/48AS50864/48

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 2a07:bbc2::/48
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2a07:bbc2:1::/4865.5k × /64AS50864IT TeleNet Ltd.62/62

History

  1. AS5086412th August 2026 present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.