SUBNET.IM

2401:3300:312::/48

Drik ICT LtdAS55828

At a glance

Subnets

65,536 × /64

/48 block

Visibility

16%

10 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Invalid

Registry

APNICBD

Allocated 15th June 2011

AS paths to this prefix

One real path per vantage point, fanning out from the origin. Where two reach the prefix the same way, those hops are drawn once. Open a path to follow it hop by hop.

OriginVantage points
AS path graph: 3 observed paths to 2401:3300:312::/48, fanning out from AS55828 toward the vantage points that see it. Each path is written out in full beneath the graph.AS55828Drik ICT LtdOriginAS58682Level3 Carrier Lt…AS9498Bharti Airtel Ltd.AS6939Hurricane Electri…AS213151Christian ElsenAS132337AxclusiveAS41913Computerline GmbHAS34288Kantonsschule ZugAS51907Kanton Zug
  1. Amsterdam558285868294986939213151This path
  2. Singapore558285868294986939132337This path
  3. London, UK558285868294986939419133428851907This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

16%

Seen by 10 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Seen by few vantage points

Observed at 3 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
APNIC — Asia-Pacific
Country
Bangladesh
Allocated
15th June 2011
Allocation block
2401:3300::/32
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Invalid

A ROA covers this prefix but does not authorise this origin AS at this prefix length. That is either a misconfiguration or a hijack, and many networks will drop the route.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2401:3300:312::/48
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2401:3300::/38AS55828/38
2401:3300::/37AS55828/37
2401:3300::/36AS55828/36
2401:3300::/35AS55828/35
2401:3300::/34AS55828/34
2401:3300::/33AS55828/33
2401:3300::/32AS55828/32

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 2401:3300:312::/48
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2401:3300:313::/4865.5k × /64AS55828Drik ICT Ltd10/62

History

  1. AS5582812th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.