2401:3300:ff::/48
At a glance
Subnets
/48 block
Visibility
10 of 62 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
Allocated 15th June 2011
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Singapore.
Seen from Singapore
- Peer of AS55828seen on 1,090 paths from 90 vantage points
- Peer of AS58682seen on 16,037 paths from 141 vantage points
- Peer of AS9498seen on 184,654 paths from 67 vantage points
- Peer of AS6939seen on 320,794 paths from 2 vantage points
One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- Amsterdam558285868294986939213151This path
- Singapore558285868294986939132337Shown above
- London, UK558285868294986939419133428851907This path
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
16%
Seen by 10 of 62 full-feed vantage points
Seen by few vantage pointsObserved at 3 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- APNIC — Asia-Pacific
- Country
Bangladesh
- Allocated
- 15th June 2011
- Allocation block
- 2401:3300::/32
- Status
- allocated
- Origin validation
- Invalid
A ROA covers this prefix but does not authorise this origin AS at this prefix length. That is either a misconfiguration or a hijack, and many networks will drop the route.
ROAs covering this prefix
| ROA prefix | Authorised origin | Max length |
|---|---|---|
| 2401:3300::/40 | AS55828 | /40 |
| 2401:3300::/39 | AS55828 | /39 |
| 2401:3300::/38 | AS55828 | /38 |
| 2401:3300::/37 | AS55828 | /37 |
| 2401:3300::/36 | AS55828 | /36 |
| 2401:3300::/35 | AS55828 | /35 |
| 2401:3300::/34 | AS55828 | /34 |
| 2401:3300::/33 | AS55828 | /33 |
| 2401:3300::/32 | AS55828 | /32 |
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Covering announcements
No less specific announcement covers this prefix.
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
No prefix of the same length in the same parent block is announced.
History
- AS5582812th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.