153.76.24.0/21
At a glance
Addresses
/21 block
Visibility
80 of 80 vantage points
RPKI
Registry
CAAllocated 23rd September 1991
AS paths to this prefix
All pathsOne observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Oregon, US.
Seen from Oregon, US
- Peer of AS62513seen on 1,053 paths from 142 vantage points
- Peer of AS835seen on 4,007 paths from 108 vantage points
- Peer of AS3257seen on 59,210 paths from 1 vantage point
- Peer of AS23352seen on 103,654 paths from 1 vantage point
USOne path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.
Every path we see
- London, UK6251383512998529This path
- Singapore625138351299132337This path
- Amsterdam62513835325734549213151This path
- Sao Paulo6251383512993356266213This path
- Oregon, US6251383532572335220130Shown above
Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.
Route visibility
100%
Seen by 80 of 80 full-feed vantage points
Globally propagatedObserved at 5 of our collectors.
What this percentage counts
The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.
It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.
Registry and RPKI
- RIR
- RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
- Country
- Canada
- Allocated
- 23rd September 1991
- Allocation block
- 153.76.0.0/19
- Status
- assigned
- Origin validation
- Invalid
A ROA covers this prefix but does not authorise this origin AS at this prefix length. That is either a misconfiguration or a hijack, and many networks will drop the route.
ROAs covering this prefix
| ROA prefix | Authorised origin | Max length |
|---|---|---|
| 153.76.24.0/21 | AS3257 | /24 |
Prefix hierarchy
Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.
Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.
Covering announcements
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 153.76.0.0/19 | 8.2k | AS835GoCodeIT Inc | 80/80 |
More specific announcements
Nothing inside this block is announced separately.
Sibling prefixes
| Prefix | Addresses | Origin | Visibility |
|---|---|---|---|
| 153.76.16.0/21 | 2k | AS62513GoCodeIT Inc | 80/80 |
History
- AS6251312th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do
A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.
Open 153.76.24.0/21 in the calculator/21 reference
Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.