subnet.im

2401:5e40::/33

Industrial Cyber Security Center of ExcellenceAS63770

At a glance

Subnets

2,147,483,648 × /64

/33 block

Visibility

100%

62 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

No ROA

Registry

APNICJP

Allocated 23rd June 2017

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.

OriginVantage point · London, UK
One AS path to 2401:5e40::/33 as seen from London, UK, read outward from the origin: AS63770 → AS59103 → AS41095 → AS34288 → AS51907. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS63770Industrial Cyber …OriginAS59103SoftEther Corpora…AS41095IPTP LTDAS34288Kantonsschule ZugAS51907Kanton Zug

Seen from London, UK

  1. 1AS63770Industrial Cyber Security Center of ExcellenceJPOrigin
    Peer of AS63770seen on 334 paths from 89 vantage points
  2. 2AS59103SoftEther CorporationJP
    Peer of AS59103seen on 2,396 paths from 124 vantage points
  3. 3AS41095IPTP LTDGB
    Peer of AS41095seen on 1,154 paths from 4 vantage points
  4. 4AS34288Kantonsschule ZugCH
    Peer of AS34288seen on 42,123 paths from 30 vantage points
  5. 5AS51907Kanton ZugCHVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. Amsterdam6377029076939213151This path
  2. Sao Paulo637702907693932590This path
  3. Singapore637705910341095132337This path
  4. London, UK6377059103410953428851907Shown above

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

100%

Seen by 62 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
APNIC — Asia-Pacific
Country
Japan
Allocated
23rd June 2017
Allocation block
2401:5e40::/32
Status
allocated
Origin validation
No ROA

No ROA covers this prefix, so RPKI has nothing to say about it either way. This is still the common case for a large share of the routing table.

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2401:5e40::/33: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2401:5e40::/33AS63770This prefix2401:5e40:1000::…AS637702401:5e40:10ff::…AS63770

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Announcements contained within 2401:5e40::/33
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2401:5e40:1000::/36268M × /64AS63770Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence59/62
2401:5e40:10ff::/4865.5k × /64AS63770Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence59/62

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 2401:5e40::/33
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2401:5e40:8000::/332.1B × /64AS63770Industrial Cyber Security Center of Excellence62/62

History

  1. AS6377012th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.