subnet.im

2001:200:e000::/35

Asia Pacific Advanced Network - JapanAS7660

At a glance

Subnets

536,870,912 × /64

/35 block

Visibility

98%

61 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

APNICJP

Allocated 23rd April 2003

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.

OriginVantage point · London, UK
One AS path to 2001:200:e000::/35 as seen from London, UK, read outward from the origin: AS7660 → AS2516 → AS6939 → AS51907. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS7660Asia Pacific Adva…OriginAS2516KDDI CorporationAS6939Hurricane Electri…AS51907Kanton Zug

Seen from London, UK

  1. 1AS7660Asia Pacific Advanced Network - JapanJPOrigin
    Peer of AS7660seen on 186 paths from 93 vantage points
  2. 2AS2516KDDI CorporationJP
    Peer of AS2516seen on 18,428 paths from 60 vantage points
  3. 3AS6939Hurricane Electric LLCUS
    Peer of AS6939seen on 132,979 paths from 2 vantage points
  4. 4AS51907Kanton ZugCHVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. Amsterdam766025166939213151This path
  2. London, UK76602516693951907Shown above
  3. Sao Paulo76602516335632590This path
  4. Singapore766025166939132337This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

98%

Seen by 61 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
APNIC — Asia-Pacific
Country
Japan
Allocated
23rd April 2003
Allocation block
2001:200:8000::/33
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2001:200:e000::/35
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2001:200:e000::/35AS7660/35
2001:200::/32AS2500/32

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2001:200:e000::/35: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2001:200::/32AS25002001:200:e000::/…AS7660This prefix2001:200:c000::/…AS23634

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

Announcements that contain 2001:200:e000::/35
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2001:200::/324.3B × /64AS2500WIDE Project61/62

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 2001:200:e000::/35
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2001:200:c000::/35537M × /64AS23634WIDE Project61/62

History

  1. AS766012th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.