SUBNET.IM

2620:1ec:7::/48

At a glance

Subnets

65,536 × /64

/48 block

Visibility

100%

62 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

ARINUS

Allocated 11th March 2015

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to Sao Paulo.

OriginVantage point · Sao Paulo
One AS path to 2620:1ec:7::/48 as seen from Sao Paulo, read outward from the origin: AS8068 → AS8075 → AS12956 → AS32590. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS8068Microsoft Corpora…OriginAS8075Microsoft Corpora…AS12956Telxius (Telefoni…AS32590Valve Corporation

Seen from Sao Paulo

  1. Peer of AS8068seen on 5,245 paths from 142 vantage points
  2. Peer of AS8075seen on 1,748 paths from 50 vantage points
  3. Peer of AS12956seen on 476,587 paths from 4 vantage points
  4. 4AS32590Valve CorporationUSVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. London, UK8068807551907This path
  2. Singapore80688075132337This path
  3. Amsterdam8068807534549213151This path
  4. Sao Paulo806880751295632590Shown above

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

100%

Seen by 62 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
ARIN — North America
Country
United States
Allocated
11th March 2015
Allocation block
2620:1ec::/36
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2620:1ec:7::/48
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2620:1ec:7::/48AS8068/48
2620:1ec::/36AS8075/36

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2620:1ec:7::/48: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2620:1ec::/36AS80752620:1ec:7::/48AS8068This prefix2620:1ec:6::/48AS8068

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

Announcements that contain 2620:1ec:7::/48
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2620:1ec::/36268M × /64AS8075Microsoft Corporation62/62

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 2620:1ec:7::/48
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2620:1ec:6::/4865.5k × /64AS8068Microsoft Corporation62/62

History

  1. AS806812th August 2026 present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.