SUBNET.IM

2a01:5b0:12::/47

Knipp Medien und Kommunikation GmbHAS50611

Knipp Medien und Kommunikation GmbHAS8561

Knipp Medien und Kommunikation GmbHAS48519

Announced by more than one origin AS (MOAS).

At a glance

Subnets

131,072 × /64

/47 block

Visibility

42%

26 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

RIPE NCCDE

Allocated 6th November 2007

AS paths to this prefix

One real path per vantage point, fanning out from the origin. Where two reach the prefix the same way, those hops are drawn once. Open a path to follow it hop by hop.

OriginVantage points
AS path graph: 4 observed paths to 2a01:5b0:12::/47, fanning out from AS8561, AS50611 toward the vantage points that see it. Each path is written out in full beneath the graph.AS50611Knipp Medien und …OriginAS20473The Constant Comp…AS213151Christian ElsenAS51907Kanton ZugAS8561Knipp Medien und …OriginAS36236NetActuate, IncAS32590Valve CorporationAS132337Axclusive
  1. Amsterdam5061120473213151This path
  2. London, UK506112047351907This path
  3. Sao Paulo85613623632590This path
  4. Singapore856136236132337This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

42%

Seen by 26 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Partially propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
Country
Germany
Allocated
6th November 2007
Allocation block
2a01:5b0::/32
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2a01:5b0:12::/47
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2a01:5b0:12::/47AS48519/47
2a01:5b0:12::/47AS50611/47
2a01:5b0:10::/45AS48519/48
2a01:5b0:10::/45AS50611/48
2a01:5b0:10::/45AS8561/48
2a01:5b0::/32AS8391/48

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2a01:5b0:12::/47: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2a01:5b0::/32AS83912a01:5b0:10::/47AS85612a01:5b0:12::/47AS50611This prefix2a01:5b0:10::/47AS50611

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

Announcements that contain 2a01:5b0:12::/47
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2a01:5b0::/324.3B × /64AS8391Knipp Medien und Kommunikation GmbH61/62

More specific announcements

Nothing inside this block is announced separately.

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 2a01:5b0:12::/47
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2a01:5b0:10::/47131k × /64AS8561Knipp Medien und Kommunikation GmbH35/62
2a01:5b0:10::/47131k × /64AS50611Knipp Medien und Kommunikation GmbH26/62

History

  1. AS856112th August 2026 — present
  2. AS5061112th August 2026 — present
  3. AS4851912th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.