SUBNET.IM

2001:a48::/32

Wroclaw Centre of Networking and SupercomputingAS8970

At a glance

Subnets

4,294,967,296 × /64

/32 block

Visibility

97%

60 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

Valid

Registry

RIPE NCCPL

Allocated 12th December 2002

AS paths to this prefix

All paths

One observed path, hop by hop, from the origin out to London, UK.

OriginVantage point · London, UK
One AS path to 2001:a48::/32 as seen from London, UK, read outward from the origin: AS8970 → AS8501 → AS2603 → AS51907. Each hop is listed with its network name beneath the graph.AS8970Wroclaw Centre of…OriginAS8501Institute of Bioo…AS2603NORDUnetAS51907Kanton Zug

Seen from London, UK

  1. 1AS8970Wroclaw Centre of Networking and SupercomputingPLOrigin
    Peer of AS8970seen on 335 paths from 135 vantage points
  2. 2AS8501Institute of Bioorganic Chemistry Polish Academy of Science, Poznan Supercomputing and Networking CenterPL
    Peer of AS8501seen on 3,712 paths from 60 vantage points
  3. 3AS2603NORDUnetDK
    Peer of AS2603seen on 1,027 paths from 2 vantage points
  4. 4AS51907Kanton ZugCHVantage point

One path, hop by hop, from the origin outward to the vantage point that saw it. Counts beside each step are how often we see that pair adjacent anywhere in the table, not how often this path was used — BGP carries no traffic figures.

Every path we see

  1. Singapore8970196844132337This path
  2. London, UK89708501260351907Shown above
  3. Sao Paulo89708501335632590This path
  4. Amsterdam89708501260334549213151This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

97%

Seen by 60 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
Country
Poland
Allocated
12th December 2002
Allocation block
2001:a48::/32
Status
allocated
Origin validation
Valid

A ROA exists that authorises this origin AS to announce this prefix at this length.

ROAs covering this prefix

Route Origin Authorisations covering 2001:a48::/32
ROA prefixAuthorised originMax length
2001:a48::/32AS8970/32

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2001:a48::/32: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2001:a48::/32AS8970This prefix2001:a48:8000::/…AS15851

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

No less specific announcement covers this prefix.

More specific announcements

Announcements contained within 2001:a48::/32
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2001:a48:8000::/36268M × /64AS15851Wroclaw Centre of Networking and Supercomputing61/62

Sibling prefixes

No prefix of the same length in the same parent block is announced.

History

  1. AS897012th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.