subnet.im

2001:16a4:630::/47

Saudi Telecom Company JSCAS39891

AS65102

Announced by more than one origin AS (MOAS).

At a glance

Subnets

131,072 × /64

/47 block

Visibility

97%

60 of 62 vantage points

RPKI

No ROA

Registry

RIPE NCCSA

Allocated 19th December 2003

AS paths to this prefix

One real path per vantage point, fanning out from the origin. Where two reach the prefix the same way, those hops are drawn once. Open a path to follow it hop by hop.

OriginVantage points
AS path graph: 4 observed paths to 2001:16a4:630::/47, fanning out from AS39891 toward the vantage points that see it. Each path is written out in full beneath the graph.AS39891Saudi Telecom Com…OriginAS25019Saudi Telecom Com…AS39386Saudi Telecom Com…AS6762Telecom Italia Sp…AS32590Valve CorporationAS1299Arelion (fka. Tel…AS34549meerfarbig GmbH &…AS213151Christian ElsenAS3356Lumen (Level 3)AS15576NTS workspace AGAS51907Kanton ZugAS6939Hurricane Electri…AS132337Axclusive
  1. Sao Paulo398912501939386676232590This path
  2. Amsterdam398912501939386129934549213151This path
  3. London, UK39891250193938633561557651907This path
  4. Singapore39891250193938633566939132337This path

Each row is one path genuinely present in the routing table at our last snapshot, read outward from the origin to the vantage point that saw it. Open a row to follow that one path hop by hop. A heavier line in the graph means more vantage points reach the prefix that same way.

Route visibility

97%

Seen by 60 of 62 full-feed vantage points

Globally propagated

Observed at 4 of our collectors.

What this percentage counts

The denominator counts only full-feed peers — peers carrying a substantially complete routing table at the moment of the snapshot. IXP route-server peers usually feed partial tables and are excluded, because including them would make a normally propagated prefix look as though half the internet could not see it.

It measures how widely an announcement has spread across the networks we can observe. It says nothing about whether the prefix is reachable from any particular place, or how it performs.

Registry and RPKI

RIR
RIPE NCC — Europe, Middle East, Central Asia
Country
Saudi Arabia
Allocated
19th December 2003
Allocation block
2001:16a0::/29
Status
allocated
Origin validation
No ROA

No ROA covers this prefix, so RPKI has nothing to say about it either way. This is still the common case for a large share of the routing table.

Prefix hierarchy

Announcements above, below and beside this one in the real routing table.

CoveringMore specific
Prefix hierarchy for 2001:16a4:630::/47: the announcements covering it on the left, the announcements inside it on the right. Every prefix drawn is also listed in the tables below.2001:16a0::/29AS393862001:16a4:632::/…AS398912001:16a4:630::/…AS39891This prefix2001:16a4:632::/…AS651022001:16a4:630::/…AS398912001:16a4:631::/…AS39891

Left to right is specificity: a shorter mask covering more address space, then this prefix, then the announcements carved out inside it. Only the first few of each are drawn — the tables below list them all.

Covering announcements

Announcements that contain 2001:16a4:630::/47
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2001:16a0::/2934.4B × /64AS39386Saudi Telecom Company JSC61/62

More specific announcements

Announcements contained within 2001:16a4:630::/47
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2001:16a4:630::/4865.5k × /64AS39891Saudi Telecom Company JSC61/62
2001:16a4:631::/4865.5k × /64AS39891Saudi Telecom Company JSC61/62

Sibling prefixes

Prefixes of the same length sharing a parent block with 2001:16a4:630::/47
PrefixAddressesOriginVisibility
2001:16a4:632::/47131k × /64AS39891Saudi Telecom Company JSC60/62
2001:16a4:632::/47131k × /64AS651021/62

History

  1. AS3989112th August 2026 — present
  2. AS6510212th August 2026 — present
Why these dates start where they do

A first-seen date is the first time we saw that origin, not the first time it appeared in BGP. Our history is forward-only with no backfill, so it says nothing about the period before we started collecting — treat the earliest dates with suspicion.

Routing data derived from RouteViews MRT archives and public registry data.